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Civil OrganisatiOns’ partiCipatiOn
in legislative prOCesses in hungary
The relationship of the civil/non-profit sector and public administration may be examined from 
several specific aspects, but in our opinion these fields may be put into three – relatively – well 
distinguishable groups. Therefore, the relationship of administrative bodies with civil organisa-
tions may be identified in a) the creation of administrative programs and participation in leg-
islation; b) the provision of public services, and c) the protection of rights. From these three this 
work undertakes to describe the aspect of civil participation in programme making and legisla-
tion in details, in a way that elaborates on the issue from the side of state administration.
The primary method of this research – due to the shortage of systematic scientific bases – can-
not be anything else but the comprehensive collection of formal institutional facilities provid-
ed by Hungarian laws.
The paper distinguishes those special forms of participation which approach the legislator (a 
state administrative body participating in legislation) directly, and those institutionalised solu-
tions through which the citizen or a particular (civil) organisation may influence the content of 
laws not by approaching the legislator (state administrative body participating in legislation), 
but through another state organisation.
It can be stated that the Hungarian legal system makes it possible to channel the direct and 
institutionalised participation of civil entities within program- and law-making activities of or-
gans belonging to public administration, expressing their interests. Moreover, the Hungarian le-
gal system has introduced developed and sophisticated mechanisms even compared to the in-
ternational legal practice. 
Real deficiencies can rather be detected concerning the material and legal consequences of 
different initiatives, the frequency of convening various corporate bodies, and mere formal 
mode of operating the particular mechanisms.
Furthermore, the trouble is that the civil/non-profit sector is strongly „infected” by direct par-
tisan politics in Hungary: there is a large number of pseudo-civil entities and initiatives within 
the scope of activities of proposal-making, advisory and coordinative bodies. A special appear-
ance of the abovementioned difficulties is the lack of strong and effective state-civil society joint 
mechanisms which aggregate and uphold Roma (Gypsy) interests. 
In summary we can draw the conclusion that  the individual segments of civil society, the polit-
ical culture and also the administrative bodies participate in legislation i. e. their representatives 
must improve to comply with the already existing legal framework of statutory instruments. 
1. iNTROdUCTiON
Very different standpoints have been developed in the Hungarian literature regarding the 
features of entities that partly fill the territory between the state bodies and the narrower pri-
vate sphere of the individual, and the boundaries of certain spheres (state, market and civil 
etc.). many say a lot, from Tamás Sárközy to Éva Kuti, they place the dividing and fault lines 
elsewhere, but all of them agree that the question is very important also from the aspect of 
the state’s performance ability as well.
Until the middle/end of the 2000s the state received serious critique, saying that the ef-
ficiency of the state organisation and within that the governmental direction is low be-
cause of the hyper proliferation of the background organisations and the constant inten-
tion aimed at the creation of half-state fake civil organisations (public foundations, pub-
lic bodies, public companies).
While in the ’90s and 2000s the majority of the authors condemned the state overload and 
the negative effects of the mesosphere, saying that it weakens civil activity, the compellingness 
to self-care, etc., today most of the criticism refers to the openly expanding state that draws the 
public duties to itself. Otherwise, in the latter case it is only  the state – recognising that direct-
ly or indirectly it is almost a sole financer in many fields – that leaves out the local governments 
and / or non-profit organisations from the task fulfilment and financing process.
Apparently a process – serving parallel and same goals – is going on, in the frameworks of 
which the state consciously reorganises the legal status and the subsidy system of the organ-
isations of the civil sphere that have potential roles in the fulfilment of public duties. 
A civil organisation – at best – creates an institutional channel between society and the 
state, transmits  society’s needs and interests towards the state, on the other hand it forc-
es the state to continuously legitimate itself and to increase the publicity of its operation. 
Civil society and political state cannot exist without each other, but both try to be supe-
rior to the other. even in a way that it expropriates the traditional institutions and classic 
territory of the other „party”…
One of the final questions is how far civil society can go in the participation of (politi-
cal) decision making? According to the general view the presence is desirable and sub-
servient only in the decision preparation phase that presents both informal and institu-
tionalised forms. 
The popularity of the presently emerging (?) ideas of good governance, as well as their in-
creased legitimacy is due not only to governmental effectiveness, but also to the closely relat-
ed participatory governance. Plural, participative democracy provides for the participation 
of society and economic players, thus civil/non-profit organisations in satisfying common 
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social needs – beyond periodic elections and referenda – within the framework of the right 
to make recommendations, to be informed and to object, as well as in several ways within 
task provision possibilities. This starting point – at least for the present – has not been signifi-
cantly changed by approaches that refer to the increasing role of the state or to the newly creat-
ed needs and demands arising from different crises.
The relationship of the civil/non-profit sector and public administration may be exam-
ined from several specific aspects, but in our opinion these fields may be put into three – 
relatively – well distinguishable groups. Therefore, the relationship of administrative bod-
ies with civil organisations may be identified in a) the creation of administrative programs 
and participation in legislation; b) the provision of public services, and c) the protection of 
rights. From these three this work undertakes to describe in details the aspect of civil partic-
ipation in programme making and legislation, in a way that elaborates on the issue from the 
side of state administration.
2. meTHOdOLOGY
The analysis – or systematic presentation – of the consultative, coordinative or adviso-
ry, proposer, opinion-shaper institutions of public administration is completely missing 
within Hungarian administrative sciences in spite of the fact that in addition to hierarchic 
and merely market mechanisms several other horizontal, coordinative and service provid-
ing mechanisms have been established which led to the spread of different autonomous – 
and usually of low efficiency – structures in Hungary. Taking into account that many – if 
not all – of these entities and mechanisms are functioning by significant involvement of 
different civil (not-for-profit) actors, the main goal of my presentation has to be an intro-
duction of the real weight and extent of this “sphere” by the collection and systematization 
of the existing forms within it. 
The primary method of this research – due to the shortage of systematic scientific bases – 
cannot be anything else than the comprehensive collection of formal institutional facilities 
provided by Hungarian laws. This study makes an attempt at introducing all the forms ap-
pearing in the positive law in Hungary; especially those by which civil/non-profit organisa-
tions can take part in the preparation of administrative programs and in law-making proc-
esses weltering within the scope of public administration.
Secondly, and of course, facts deducible from the texts of laws must be compared with re-
ality, with factual practices of administrative organs: the execution of legal provisions some-
times demonstrates “creative” interpretations, moreover the very same legal institutions are 
implemented with huge variances during different periods.
And finally, as a third aspect, broader approaches to legal and public policy must be in-
volved: the basic features, historical processes and the dominant factors de facto determin-
ing law-making and the implementation of law in Hungary are to be shown.
Our study shall be commenced with the abovementioned aspect of public policy, outlin-
ing the most important phenomena of the last decades.
3. THe TRAdiTiONAL FeATUReS OF HUNGARiAN PUbLiC AdmiNiSTRA-
TiON iN PUbLiC POLiCY APPROACH
A starting point of this subchapter is that new Central-eastern-european democracies estab-
lished after 1989 did not build the political system on layered, sophisticated consultation pro-
cedures and institutional systems based on wide-scale social participation, but – almost exclu-
sively – on the Parliament-centred policy formation structures operating on the principle of 
representation. many believe that one of the great problems of societies getting out from under 
a dictatorship is that due to the lack of civil society filling in the space between individuals and 
the state during their socialisation, the members of these societies could never naturally learn 
to incorporate the identification of problems, the formulation of their interests, exchange their 
thoughts, the harmonisation of different opinions, due to which various problem-handling 
methods were not developed either. From public policy side it may be stated that in Hungary 
the legal and institutional requirements of representative democracy were fulfilled after 1990, 
but since then no material change has happened towards participative democracy; this means 
that Hungarian democracy ”has frozen into” the level of representative democracy.1 
A further tendency, a feature which may be hardly separated from the one mentioned ear-
lier is that the all-time state – formed after the transition – imitates, reconstructs and replac-
es the civil sector through its conscious efforts, by this making it weaker. during the analysis 
of this, it must not be forgotten that in the economic and sociological literature of the past 
one or two decades the state, by undertaking the ‘replacement’ and ‘simulation’ of the organ-
isation of market and self-regulating social mechanisms and the political organisation of so-
ciety, it eventually hampers the connection between political decision-making mechanisms 
and the actual fragmentation of the interests of society.
based on the main features of public policy/administrative environment it must be stated 
about Hungary in advance that a) due to the traditional from ‘top-down’ system, a general – 
and tendency-like – weakness is the lack of democratic control, accountability and transpar-
ency; b) due to the politicised and instable practice of the reconciliation of interests, the quali-
ty of the decisions made in the public sector are often insufficient, as is their execution; c) pub-
lic policy has balance problems; the weight and coordination of the relevant players are dis-
proportionate and incalculable due to the extreme politicisation, and political predominance 
characterises the relationship of the political-administrative system and society, regardless; d) 
the final phase of public policy is missing; public policy processes begin but they often do not 
get to the end. There is no evaluation phase or closure.2 Within the scope of the latter evalua-
tion  preliminary and subsequent impact studies are determinative, the main goal of which is 
grounding the decision-making situation of the legislator, so far the analysis expands the pool 
of factors the consideration of which is – or should be – essential for well thought-through, 
1 Jenei, György. 2010. Adalékok az állami szerepvállalás közpolitika-elméleti hátteréről. [Supplements to the 
public policy – theoretical background of state participation] in Államszerep válság idején [State role in crisis]. 
edited by Hosszú, Hortenzia and Gellén, márton. budapest: COmPLex. 95.
2 Pesti, Sándor. 2001. Közpolitika szöveggyűjtemény. budapest: Rejtjel. 206.
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grounded decision.3 in the Hungarian model of public policy decision making – as mentioned 
before – the ‘top-down’ approach is dominant, insofar as the institutional mechanisms of the 
involvement of interest protection-integrative organisations operate only formally.4 it is insep-
arable from the latter fact that the traditional features of Hungarian political culture are pater-
nalism, intolerance and the transformation of personal relations into political ones,5 and last 
but not least the presence of corruption phenomena, which may be observed at a degree ex-
ceeding the average of the surrounding area.6 Among the classic governmental failure phe-
nomena – which is not traditionally Hungarian, but may definitely be observed here – the the-
oretical difficulties of setting and measuring public policy goals may be mentioned, as well as 
influence of strong interest groups, difficulties related to the size and complexity of govern-
mental activities, and to the causal interconnection of certain public policy problems.7
in the 1990s – after the transition – there was a regrettable shift: during the transition to 
a market economy, the state withdrew from a number of fields, but during this ‘abolishment 
of the state’ several tasks could not be exposed to the profit-oriented processes of the mar-
ket. These tasks were usually incorporated in the so-called non-profit sector, which was un-
fortunately mixed up with civil organisations both legally and practically: ‘it often happened 
that in complete sectors only the signboards were repainted, shifted from state to public util-
ity status, while the old structure, the old system of operation, state financing and the old ‘ex-
pert’ staff remained.’8 This environment, however, had a weakening effect on organised civil 
society, upholding its – unnecessarily strong – dependant status.
4. CiViL PARTiCiPATiON iN PROGRAmme mAKiNG ANd LeGiSLATiON
4.1. General Questions of Civil Participation in Programme Making and Legislation 
Among the general pre-questions we shall refer to the fact that the narrowly viewed par-
liamentary section of legislation (which is not the subject of this work) and the section in 
which the contribution of state administration bodies is realised differ from each other, and 
the social organisations’ participatory rights and competences are also different in the two 
3 in details see: A Közigazgatás Korszerűsítésének kormánybiztosa által készített szempontok. „Részletes útmutató 
a hatályos jogszabályok utólagos és jogszabálytervezetek előzetes felülvizsgálatához.” [Aspects prepared by the 
government commissioner of the modernization of public administration. ‘detailed guide to the subsequent 
review of valid laws and the preliminary review of draft laws.’] 1995. budapest: Közigazgatás Korszerűsítésének 
Kormánybiztosa.  5.  
4 Jenei (n 1) 95.
5 Kulcsár, Kálmán. 1995. Politika és jogszociológia. [Politics and legal sociology] budapest: Akadémiai. 336.
6 http://www.ey.com/HU/hu/Newsroom/News-releases/global_fraud_survey_2010_pr (accessed July 11, 
2013).
7 Hajnal, György. 2008. Adalékok a magyar közpolitika kudarcaihoz. [Supplements to the failures of Hungarian 
public politics] budapest: KszK ROP 3.1.1. Programigazgatóság. 33.
8 Pankucsi, márta. 2012. Civilekkel a civilekért – Az ellenzéki szerveződésektől a minisztériumon át a Furmann 
alapítványokig. [With civilians for civilians – From opposition organisations through the ministry to the Fur-
mann foundations] in Civil társadalom és érdekképviselet Közép-Európában. [Civil society and the representa-
tion of interests in Central-europe] edited by Simon János.  budapest: L’Harmattan – CePoliti. 144.
phases.9 Furthermore, there are significant differences between contributions to the decree 
making of state administrative bodies and of local governments.
The possible ways of participation may be categorised from several aspects:
Social participation in legislation has legally detailed (institutionalised) forms appearing on 
the side of the legislator as obligation (negotiations, forums, consultations and related basic 
feedback), as well as forms about which only general rules of the legal system may provide a 
starting point regarding their possible content or limits (organisation of demonstrations, re-
questing expert opinion, establishing an online debate forum, etc.), without having any legal 
minimum regulation about the ‘observation’ and utilisation of such information transmitted 
to the decision-maker this way, and therefore these have been primarily regulated as possibil-
ities of the potential users of these forms (these forms are not in the focus of this work).
Among institutions establishing some kind of obligation on the side of the legislator, there 
are extremely diverse tools considering their ‘features and scope’, which show great diversity 
also regarding the degree and directness of the role they play in establishing the content of 
the final (normative) decision, or regarding the targeted level of decision making/legislation 
(local, national or european). it is worth noting that this work concentrates primarily on the 
institutions of civil cooperation operating at national level – for the sake of understanding 
primarily in the state administration/local government division.
The literature, in another approach, categorises the tools and techniques of social partici-
pation into two big groups, distinguishing between traditional techniques and modern tech-
niques. Among the latter ones, for example, the use of surveys may be mentioned.10
One of the most obvious groupings of available tools (institutional possibilities) is – as 
mentioned above – the traditional division of direct and indirect tools: in this regard the no-
tion of directness means, one the one hand, the institutions (typically in bodies) in which 
the representatives of civil society may express themselves directly and, may be able to make 
some decisions, while, on the other hand, directness may be used also in the sense that the 
civil organisation directly approaches the legislative body (thus in our narrow interpreta-
tion, the competent central state administrative body or the body of representatives) with its 
suggestion or opinion. in the latter approach the indirect feature also means the influencing 
of the public administrative legislative body through another legislative body or person. 
The titles of the chapter and the sub-chapter intentionally do not focus only on the main 
characteristics and rules of participation in the narrowly interpreted legislation, but also 
wish to mention at least those practices (institutions) through which civil/non-profit or-
ganisations may perform activities – which may not be transformed into legal instruments, 
but fit into the frameworks of law – influencing the life of the closer/broader community 
and participate in the creation of documents (strategies, concepts, declarations, calls, etc.). 
9 Vadál, ildikó. 2011. A kormányzati döntések konzultációs mechanizmusai. [Consultation mechanisms of gov-
ernmental decisions] budapest: COmPLex. 163.
10 Reisinger, Adrienn. 2012. Civil/nonprofit szervezetek a kohéziós politikában – elméleti alapok. [Civil and non-
profit organisations in cohesion policy – theoretical background] Tér és Társadalom 40: 113.
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Therefore, when for the sake of understanding legislation is mentioned, it shall be interpret-
ed – in a broader sense – by taking into account the abovementioned.
One of the most important pre-questions is how far civil society may go in participation in 
(political) decision making. According to the general (majority) national opinion, its pres-
ence is reasonable and desired only in the preparation phase of decision making manifesting 
informal and institutionalised forms.11 
Within the analysis of regulations related to legislation, it may be observed that the regula-
tion – especially with regard to the issue before us – is still very much diverse.12 before 1 Jan-
uary 2011, there was no comprehensive act which could have attempted to provide unified 
regulation for the possibilities and procedures of the enforcement of social interests in gov-
ernmental decision-making mechanisms. A unified set of regulations about social partici-
pation is still missing; even though Act Cxxxi of 2010 on social participation in the prep-
aration of laws “implies in its title that we are facing a unified regulation, but this is not the 
case. in addition to this, sets of acts and government decrees contain relevant regulations 
regarding this issue.”13 Judit Tóth noted earlier that ’The scope of tools related to the opera-
tion of the Government and the Office of the Prime minister14 is rather diverse. Their com-
mon characteristic is that they rarely form a unified system, and rather try to find support-
ers among civilians for the specific realisation of the goals of the given government.’15 After 
reviewing the relevant valid regulations, we may arrive to a similar conclusion.
The significance of this scope of issues is magnified by the fact that in a plural social order 
more and more interests and values are formulated, the channelling of which into govern-
mental decisions is unavoidable in order to uphold social peace. However, social participa-
tion in governmental decision-making mechanisms shall be legally settled, just like the hier-
archy of laws. in a rule of law state social participation in legislative procedures is not an op-
tional process depending on the attitude and discretion of the power holder. moreover, in a 
democracy, especially one of the participative type, the institutionalised system of proposing 
and opinion making shall not only go through quantity changes (’more forums, better regu-
lation’), but also quality ones, which means that regarding these, normativity does not on-
ly mean the obligation to establish and create these institutions, but also ‘making them una-
voidable’, thus ensuring their development through tools protected by law.
To summarize, it may be stated that one tool for alleviating possible political abuses typi-
cal in indirect democracy is the substantial participation of citizens and their organisations 
in public administrative decision making (legislation and the lawful influencing of individu-
al cases), and the facilitation of this in a constantly “broadening” scope. 
11 Sebestyén, istván. 2004. Civil dilemmák, civil kételyek a civil szervezetek (köz)életében. [Civil dilemmas, civil 
doubts in the (public) life of civil organisations] Civil Szemle 28: 36. 
12 Vadál (n 9) 170. 
13 ibid.
14 Tóth, Judit. 2003. Civilek részvétele a jogalkotásban. [Participation of civil society in legislation] in Nonprofit 
jog. [Non-profit law] edited by Tóth, Judit. Szeged: SZTe ÁJK. 18. 
15 Today Prime Minister’s Office.
In consideration of the before mentioned, that division may be the most obvious which
A) distinguishes those special forms of participation – regulated by law – able to influence leg-
islation which approaches the legislator directly (a state administrative body participating 
in legislation), and
b) distinguishes those institutionalised solutions through which the citizen or a particular (civ-
il) organisation may influence the content of laws not by approaching the legislator (state 
administrative body participating in legislation), but through another state organisation.16 
4.2. Civil tools in state administration directly influencing the legislator
4.2.1. Direct participation in programme making and legislation without membership in bodies
I. Organisation of a national referendum proposal
Act CCxxxViii of 2013 on Referendum Proposal, european Citizens’ initiative and Refer-
endum Procedure states that the proposal of constituents on setting the date of national ref-
erenda may be organised – among others – by associations as well, if the given question is 
connected with the scope of activities set forth in their articles of association.17
II. Notice of public concern
A notice of public concern directs attention to some circumstances the fixing or termination 
of which serves the interests of the community or the whole society. For our topic it is ex-
tremely important that the notice of public concern may contain recommendations for legis-
lation. [Article 141 paragraph (3) of Act xxix of 2004 on the amendment and repeal of cer-
tain laws as well as the establishment of certain regulations relating to Hungary’s accession 
to the european Union]. The notion of complaint and notice of public interest, as well as the 
related deadlines are regulated similarly by Act CLxV of 2013 on complaints and notices of 
public interest to the way they were regulated before. However, there is a novelty in the reg-
ulation, namely that notices of public interest may be made in the protected electronic sys-
tem of notices of public interest [Article 4 paragraph (1)]. 
III. Social negotiation and opinions
The two basic forms of social participation in the preparation of laws, general negotiation 
and direct negotiation appear in Article 7 of Act Cxxxi of 2010 on social participation. The 
scope of the act covers opinion making by natural persons and non-state and non-local gov-
ernmental bodies, organisations about draft laws and concepts of regulations grounding 
draft laws prepared by ministers. [Article 1 paragraph (1)] According to article 5 paragraph 
(5) of the act – with the exception of some laws made in fields listed in an itemised way in 
paragraph (3) (e.g. draft law on the establishment of organisations or institutions) – social ne-
16 For example, the initiation of the procedure of the parliamentary commissioner of fundamental right based on 
Article 24 paragraph (2) point e) and Article 30 paragraph (1) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
17 Article 2 paragraph (1) point c).
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gotiation shall be initiated about the draft and reasoning of a) acts, b) decrees of government 
and c) decrees of ministers. 
General negotiation provides for the possibility of giving opinion through the website of 
the body publishing the concepts or drafts (in forms obligatory for the body requesting 
opinion, e.g. by obligatory confirmation or preparation of substantial summaries), while the 
direct negotiation allows the relevant minister to request opinion directly from persons and 
organisations. The primary legal form of direct negotiation is the institution of strategic part-
nership – creating obligations also on the side of the minister – the framework of which is 
provided by an agreement determining several elements.18 Through these agreements, the 
minister responsible for the preparation of laws may establish close cooperation with those 
organisations which are ready for mutual cooperation, and which represent wide-scope so-
cial interests in the preparation of the regulation of the given legal fields, or perform scien-
tific activities in the given legal field (hereinafter referred to as strategic partners). A sub-
stantive weakness of the regulation is that Article 13 paragraph (2) of the Act defines only in 
an exemplificative way – mentioning only some of the possible forms of organisations (e.g. 
registered church, trade union, civil organisation) – with whom such strategic partnership 
may be established. Another specific (and problematic) rule is the one according to which 
the obligation of the strategic partner is to represent the opinion of organisations which are 
not strategic partners but operate in the given field of law [Article 14 paragraph (1)]. in some 
cases this could mean that the opinion of the ’rival’ organisation operating in the given field 
should be represented fully and credibly.
Another important rule [Article 14 paragraph (2)] in this area is that in addition to the 
strategic partners the minister responsible for the preparation of the given law may integrate 
others into the direct negotiation of the relevant draft, and upon request it shall provide the 
possibility for participation in the review of the given law.
However, it shall also be mentioned that the minister responsible for the preparation of 
laws may resort to other forms in addition to the abovementioned two for conducting ne-
gotiation (primarily for getting to know the opinion of non-strategic members).19 it is also 
18 A good example of strategic partnership is the strategic agreement established in November 2012 between Ti-
bor Navracsics deputy prime minister, minister of public administration and justice, as representative of the 
ministry of Public Administration and Justice, and László Csizmadia, president and the representative of the 
Civil Cooperation Public benefit Foundation, providing the organisational background of CÖF (Civil Coop-
eration Forum).
19 it usually depends on the ad hoc decision of the ministries’ management which draft law will be negotiated at 
public debate, conference and informal discussion, in order to discuss the text of the regulatory concepts and 
drafts. These forms usually happen in parallel with public administrative negotiation.
important that the abovementioned act allows the legislator to define other opinion-making 
and negotiation rights in other laws and legal instruments of state administration.20
For assessing the real – practical – significance of that legal institution it shall be considered 
that Article 5 paragraph (5) of the Act contains a special and often used rule, which states 
that “The draft of the law shall not be put up for social negotiation if exceptional public or-
der requires its urgent approval”. Within the regulation and actual practice of national ne-
gotiation and review a significant aspect mentioned by literature is the capacity of public ad-
ministration (insofar as with personal, technological and primarily temporal limits, the cau-
tiousness of public administration may be easily explained). Therefore, the extension of the 
examined procedure with guarantee elements shall not result in disproportionate burden for 
state (administrative) organisations, endangering applicability.
The real legal nature of broadly interpreted social review is shown by certain constitutional 
requirements related to the social players of the preparation of laws. According to the state-
ment of the Constitutional Court made in its decision 469/b/1990 CC, if the organisations 
drafting the laws do not comply with the obligations set forth in the Act on Legislation, this 
violation of obligations in itself shall not be sufficient reason for assessing the unconstitu-
tionality of the enacted laws. Such violation of legal regulations about the preparation of laws 
may only ground the state administrative or political responsibility of the legislator.21 As the 
Constitutional Court expressed in its decision 30/2000 (x. 11.) CC, only those organisations 
are unavoidable for the legislator, which are expressly and specifically named in law, which 
bear consensual or review rights and – due to their role in the democratic decision-mak-
ing process, with regard to the negotiation obligations – they possess public power. if the act 
does not define expressly and specifically those organisations with review rights, but only 
regulates the review rights of the interested national interest-representative organisations in 
general, the Constitutional Court did not consider the lack of review procedure a violation 
of the rule of law [as later decision 20/2001 (iV. 12.) CC referred back to this decision].22 
This practice has not changed significantly after the approval of the Fundamental Law and 
the new Act on Legislation.
20 beyond those set forth in the act on legislation – extending to strategic documents as well – there are rules among 
the provisions of Government decree 38/2012 (iii. 12.) on governmental strategic management about the social 
review of drafts. According to Article 15 paragraph (1) of the abovementioned decree, ‘if in relation with the giv-
en strategic document this decree regulates so, during preparation it shall be ensured for non-state actors to ac-
cess the draft and express their opinion regarding it’. According to Article 16 paragraph (1) of the mentioned de-
cree within social review drafts shall be published also on the government website determined in Article 1 point 
b) of Government decree 301/2010 (xii. 23.) on the publication and review of draft laws and regulatory concepts 
(which theoretically means unlimited and free access) and is shall be ensured for everyone to express an opin-
ion about it in a digital form (as well as about any other draft, as well). According to Article 19 paragraph (1) of 
the mentioned government decree the person responsible for the preparation of the strategic plan documentation 
may initiate negotiations about the draft with selected non-state actors, in addition to social review.
21 Vadál (n 9) 184. 
22 ibid. 
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IV. Lobby activities
Lobby activities are worth mentioning in a separate subsection, with special regard to cor-
ruption, which is quite significant in Hungary.23 The regulatory activities of ministries, or in 
a broader concept, governmental legislation, make the institutions of the government targets 
of lobbying. The creation of the topics and target persons of lobbying is determined by – in 
addition to the general structure of the governmental decision-making system – the level of 
development of the institutional system and decision-making processes of the government, 
achieved in relation to the extension of the role taking of the state.24 during the performance 
of their tasks, civil servants represent a public administration which is more open than ever, 
which maintains wide-scale professional and social relationship networks, which detects and 
reacts on influences coming from society to an increasing degree. The appearance of ‘public 
policy communities’ show that public law players frequently get into contact with each oth-
er, realise their common interests and act together when formulating their professional needs. 
Players composing these communities are familiar with the elements of public policy institu-
tions and procedures, and know the real significance of factors influencing the public policy 
decision-making mechanism. moreover, in Hungary it may also be observed that in order to 
increase the efficiency of the enforcement of interests, any decision which forms the conditions 
and elements of public policy procedures may become the subject of lobbying – even if it has 
distant relations with the given fields and requires legislation. These may be budgetary, institu-
tion organisational or personal issues (e.g. in some sectoral fields, interest groups do not rep-
resent strictly professional issues but strive to influence the appointment of executive officers). 
This is an important issue, even though in European countries the strictly centralised manage-
ment of public administration usually significantly keeps away external interest groups from deci-
sions affecting the internal operation of public administration.25
The aim of the Lobby Act submitted and approved in 2006 (Act xLix of 2006 on lobby ac-
tivities) was to channel the influence of business interest on public power (decisions) into le-
gally regulated areas and make them controllable. Therefore it did not target all forms of the 
enforcement of interests, but only those which were performed by ‘professional’ lobbyists or 
lobby organisations based on a commission and against remuneration. The linking of strict-
ly interpreted civil/non-profit organisations to lobby activities in Hungary is somewhat dif-
ficult to understand, because the scope of the previous act on lobbying covered only organ-
isations performing lobby activities in a commercial manner (based on agreement, for re-
muneration) – thus did not concern the presentation of interests or arm twisting by organ-
isations due to ‘commitment to their members’, ‘belief ’, ‘patronage’, or ‘altruism’. Neverthe-
less several organisations which represent interests have operated as associations in Hunga-
23 Közigazgatás Korrupció-megelőzési Programja 2012 – 2014. [The corruption prevention programme of public 
administration 2012-2014] 2012. budapest: Kim. 3-12. 
24 Lékó, Zoltán, ed. 2002. Lobbikézikönyv. [Lobby Handbook] budapest: demokrácia Kutatások magyar 
Központja Közhasznú Alapítvány. 25.
25 ibid.
ry, and – within some limits – it has never been prohibited for them to perform some activ-
ities in a commercial manner.
The act was valid for an exceptionally short period of time (only for four years): among the 
reasons for its failure were the fact that the majority of those representing economic interests 
favoured the maintenance-support of self-regulation; the forcing of common law elements 
completely different from the Hungarian environment; institutions appeared which were 
not interpretable for Hungarian political, administrative and legal culture; owing to these 
factors, Hungarian public administration went into passive resistance;26 furthermore, there 
was the quasi lex imperfecta feature of the act, as well as the insufficiency of control mecha-
nisms outside of law. Still, the most determinative feature was the narrow substantial scope 
of the act, the fact that it wished to regulate one narrow aspect of the issue – easily eluded 
by covering material interests – at a high level, without listing or at least slightly regulating 
the other types of influence – extending the scope of lobby activities to those, as well. The 
previous regulation practically did not consider the fact that today only those organisations 
may achieve real results which have serious professional background and resources, and are 
able to keep up with the latest novelties of technological development – in each case through 
professionally organised transmission of information. The regulation considered lobbyists 
‘in reality’, approaching the civil servant personally or by means of telecommunication, and 
neglected the more sophisticated, but very much influential, financed forms of pressuring 
[constant pressuring through ‘position papers’ summarising the official opinion, ‘grassroots 
type lobbying’ (when many write on the same topic under their ‘own name’), or certain in-
direct tools of ‘community relations’ improving the consideration of the organisation by the 
decision-makers were fully excluded from the regulation.]. 
it was the failure of the previous Lobby Act which showed that in certain fields the state can-
not intervene with its substitutive regulations even in the absence of self-regulation (which has 
been spreading significantly against central regulations): in some social fields, permanent re-
sults may be achieved only through the consistent stimulation of self-regulating mechanisms, 
which is a slow and delicate solution, but lacks any alternative. This is the reason – partly – 
why the new lobby regulation creates obligatory rules related to the enforcement of interests on-
ly on the side of the civil servant receiving the lobbyist (by this strengthening the integrity of pub-
lic administration),27 and otherwise it trusts itself to the already established criminal law barri-
26 According to the report of the Justice Service of the ministry of Public Administration and Justice prepared in 
2012 the 307 registered lobbyists tried to ‘officially’ influence only 316 (!) state or self-governmental measures 
within four years. e.g. according to the report at the approximately 3,200 local governments the lobbyists ap-
proached the competent persons only in relation to 30 decisions within four years (!)…
27 Hungary undertook the obligation to establish Codes of Professional Ethics for civil servants and the employ-
ee protection public order approved by professional public bodies independent from the government. See Sec-
tion 1 of Government decision 1080/2013. (ii. 25.) on the approval of the action plan about the obligations of 
Hungary within the international initiative of the Open Government Partnership.
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ers (e.g. the crime of bribery).28 in Hungary this concept – realising social realities – conflict-
ed with the opinion of organisations regarding the previous concept. Thus Amnesty Interna-
tional, Greenpeace, the Társaság a Szabadságjogokért (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, TASZ) 
and others approached the minister of public administration and justice with an open letter in 
2012, complaining that after 2010 it was not regulated substantively how business associations 
and business interest groups may influence the possessors of public power: ‘Article 19 section 
b) of Act Cxxxi of 2010 on social participation in legislation (hereinafter referred to as: SPL) 
annulled Act xLix of 2000 on lobby activities without replacing it with proper regulations. The 
possibility of strategic partnership ensured in Article 13 of SPL concerns only a narrow field 
of the enforcement of interests. Through strategic partnership, ministries may establish direct 
relationship with those organisations ready for mutual cooperation which represent a wide 
range of social interests in the preparation of the regulation of the given legal fields, or perform 
scientific activities in the given legal field. This act is far from regulating lobbying properly. it 
provides exclusively for cooperation with the ministries, even though lobbying is more than 
participation in ministerial level legislation: each activity aiming at influencing a public power 
decision or at the enforcement of interests belongs to the scope of lobbying.’29
in summary it may be stated (and it is confirmed by the letter of TASZ) that in Hungary 
the notion of lobbying may be apprehended in broader context than commercial activities, 
and may be interpreted and regulated likewise. 
4.2.2. Participation in Programme Making and Legislation Through Membership in Bodies
4.2.2.1. Consultation
National definition of consultation
in Hungary the broadest concept of consultation is used in a triple interpretation (or meaning):
a) on the one hand, the broader meaning includes the most comprehensive forms of social ne-
gotiation and review [System of National Cooperation (NeR), National consultation];
b) on the other hand, it includes the legal forms of negotiation and review described earlier;
c) finally, it still includes the specific, described consultative forums, as well.
The present sub-chapter uses the third – narrower, more traditional – meaning as its start-
ing point.
General issues of consultation
in relation to consultation, it may be generally stated that grounded decision making, qual-
ity governance and legislation require discussion with the interested parties, including con-
28 it has been a debated issue in Hungarian public administration at what level and at what depth the profession-
al ethical norms enforceable within public service shall be regulated; within the framework of the Magyary 
Zoltán Public Administration Development Programme – theoretically – the old approach is getting stronger 
again, which – within legal frameworks – would allow for the wide-scope self-regulation of those concerned.
29 http://tasz.hu/jogallamvedo?page=2 (accessed may 10, 2013).
sultation. Consultation is the involvement of those concerned in the procedure of decision 
making in order to create real social negotiation. in this sense, therefore, the definition re-
lates not only to negotiation in the preparatory phase, but also to the unique realisation of 
the shaping of political will, which happens in order to establ ish the content of the law based 
on compromise.30 ‘in the long run, social peace may be maintained by compromises through 
the politics of agreements. Governance may be ‘successful and good’ only if it takes into ac-
count the heterogeneity of those governed.’31 
The significance of consultation is also stressed by the Commission, which published an 
announcement about consultation, supporting the notion that during consultation each of 
those concerned should be allowed to properly express their opinion.32 in most member 
states of the european Union separate permanent forums have been established for mac-
ro-level consultation which facilitate the continuous relationship between the government 
and social partners and other representatives of interests – without the burden of imme-
diate agreements – and within this they get the chance to familiarise themselves with each 
other’s opinion.33 beyond the narrow focus of issues related to the world of labour, this 
covers also specific policy issues. in member states, macro level consultations aiming at 
globally shaping the economy and social policy are usually hosted within the institution-
al frameworks of prestigious, dominant forums. Naturally, governmental-civil discussion 
shall also be part of social discussion. in addition to social partners, the representatives of 
civil organisations ‘shall also be present in the work of the consultative bodies of macro-
level negotiation of interests’.34
Nevertheless, ‘it may be stated that the prestige of consultation is much lower in Hun-
gary than in other member states’.35 in Hungary the consultative role is often interpret-
ed as of low value, failure – also in the self-evaluation, self-assessment of the players; 
as a synonym of slow marginalisation in substantial – macro level – policy-making. This 
same fact lies in the background of the fact that in Hungary consultation, negotiation, 
cooperation is basically agreement-centred, bargain-oriented. We shall also add that to-
day in Hungary ‘consultation is [often] not the indicator or instrument of values, but of 
relatively quickly changing interests’. A closely related phenomenon (fact) is that while 
in most of the old member states consultation is substantial (ensured by legal guaran-
tees) and constant, in Hungary – traditionally – a lower level of regulation and ‘ad hoc’ 
30 drinóczi, Tímea 2010. minőségi jogalkotás és adminisztratív terhek csökkentése európában. [Quality legisla-
tion and the reduction of administrative burdens in europe] budapest: HVG-ORAC. 32-33.
31 Vadál (n 9) 57. 
32 Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties by the Commission. Communication for the Commission, COm(2002) 704 
final.
33 Ladó, mária and Tóth, Ferenc. 2002. A konzultáció és intézményei az európai Unióban, tagállamaiban és mag-
yarországon. [Consultation and its institutions in the european Union, in its member states and in Hungary] 
budapest: OFA. 192. 
34 bódi, György and Jung, Adrienn and Lakovits, elvira. 2003. Civil partnerség. [Civil partnership.] budapest: 
KJK-KeRSZÖV. 190.
35 ibid. 194.
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character is dominant36, a situation intensified by the exceptionally infrequent convening 
of certain forums.
The regulation regarding bodies operating alongside the Government (and ministries and 
other public administrative bodies) is individual: generally the operation of each body is set-
tled by separate law or legal instruments of state administration, which contributes to the 
fact that there is often parallelism or overlaps in their tasks and competences.37 The func-
tions of bodies operating beside the government are not always possible to separate; some-
times bodies with the same tasks operate under different names (e.g. inter-ministerial com-
missions or councils – see later). The main reason for these difficulties is that ‘in Hungary 
comprehensive, high-level framework regulations about the main types are still missing’.38 
We do not necessarily agree that the issue should be regulated in more detailed constitution-
al rules, but it seems obvious that a detailed regulation at the level of acts is necessary. The 
more comprehensive regulation of consultative bodies is reasonable because the broadly inter-
preted governmental consultation goes beyond consultative bodies operating beside the govern-
ment or ministries, and includes macro level forums independent from the governments, as well 
as territorial level mechanisms and specific bodies.
it must also be added that ‘by today a complex system of governmental consultative bod-
ies has been established in all modern public administrative systems’.39 However, despite 
their significance and quantity, the social sciences pay relatively little attention to these insti-
tutions, having a role in the shaping of governmental decisions, ‘[even though] almost invis-
ibly a new sector has emerged, the operation of which is essential for the quality of govern-
mental activities and is also important for their transparency.’40 
it should be noted that there is no good name for this system of organisations in Hungar-
ian law. The expressions ‘background institutions’, ‘auxiliary organisations’, or ‘consultative 
organisation’, ‘institutions of social dialogue’, as well as ‘proposer-review organisations’ are 
(may be) imprecise and deceptive, especially because in some cases these – very diverse – 
organisations possess public power-like competences in addition to the narrowly interpret-
ed consultative rights.
Therefore it is necessary to scientifically define the various types of these organisa-
tions and clarify – in a comparative manner – their role in public power decision mak-
ing (the preparation of laws), and due to the lack of any laws to generally regulate their 
participation in the governmental decision-making system, with regard to their impor-
tance (see later).
36 Ladó and Tóth (n 33) 193.
37 Vadál (n 9) 80. 
38 ibid. 
39 Vadál (n 9) 17.
40 ibid. 
Grouping of consultative bodies
For the transparency of governmental consultative41 bodies, they may be grouped accord-
ing to the following actors:42
a) the scope of participating organisations (e.g. delegating member);
b) their features of civil cooperation;
c) their method of selecting members;
d) the legal regulation of the institution;
e) the features and content of the members’ rights;
f) the frequency of application; and
g) the phase or level of governmental activities to which each is related.
Ad a) Types of governmental (state administrative) consultative bodies based on their members
based on the scope of the participating bodies (organisations) Vadál distinguishes between in-
ternal consultative bodies of governmental activities and external consultative bodies of govern-
mental activities. in the first one, she lists those institutions and procedures (e.g. government 
commissions, cabinets and inter-ministerial commissions), in which only state bodies partic-
ipate and the representatives of civil society (non-state bodies) are usually not present among 
the members. into the latter grouping she lists those bodies within which, in addition to the 
representatives of governmental bodies, the institutions of the widest range of civil society are 
present: such as social organisations, representatives of interests, professional and expert or-
ganisations, representatives of science, professional chambers, etc. Within this grouping it is 
important that ‘through these bodies, the interconnection between governmental activities 
and the activities of organisations interested in and concerned about decisions may be estab-
lished. Through these bodies, the presentation of interests, their collision, striving for consen-
sus, and the professional and scientific grounding of decisions may be realised’.43
There is another grouping similar to Vadál’s which, as one method of the presentation and 
enforcement of specific aspects of interests – is significant in the preparation of governmen-
tal decisions – at each level and area of governmental activities [partly sectoral (strictly pro-
fessional) and partly functional (beyond the aspects of certain sectors], which
a) enforces the given (public policy) interests by establishing an independent coordinative 
mechanism or body (mainly relying on the staff of the state administration), or
b) introduces the institutional solutions – including external actors – of ‘transmitting infor-
mation’ related to interests ‘into governmental activities’.44
As it has been mentioned before, both types of organisations may be put into the group of 
so-called governmental auxiliary bodies the ‘common feature of which is that part or all of 
41 in lack of other indication primarily consultative bodies operating next to central state administrative bodies 
are in the focus of the analysis.
42 Vadál (n 9) 60.
43 ibid.
44 balázs, istván. 2011. magyarország közigazgatása. [Hungary’s public administration] in Szamel, Katalin, balázs 
istván, Gajduschek György and Koi Gyula, eds. Az Európai Unió tagállamainak közigazgatása. [Public admin-
istration of the european Union’s member states] budapest: COmPLex. 745. 
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their activities is related to the governmental decision-making procedure with the aim that 
these decisions shall be well-grounded from all – professional, legal and political – aspects 
and the delivered decisions shall be used also in reality’.45 
based on the abovementioned facts, it is clear that the two types of organisations are not 
‘identical’: while the second – theoretically – serves the observation, aggregation of interests 
and their transmission to the decision-makers, the first one performs the channelling of the 
revealed interests, and the professional preparation of their presentation in the drafts of dif-
ferent programs and legal instruments, as well as their negotiation and concretisation within 
public administration. However, the majority of practical difficulties well interpretable from 
the side of civil society result from the lack of regulation and the conflict of existing regula-
tions related to the tasks and composition of these two ‘types of organisations’ and their rela-
tionship, with regard to the fact that the two types of bodies exist simultaneously. For exam-
ple, the two consultative bodies for the representation and facilitation of the management of 
Roma issues have been established accordingly, but the relationship between the inter-min-
isterial Committee for Social development and Roma issues46 and the Roma Coordinative 
Council47 has not been clarified; it is hardly interpretable and less transparent, based on gov-
ernment decisions and practical experiences.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that within the internal negotiating mecha-
nisms of state administration (at the meeting of the Government performing final coordina-
tion, or in different coordinative and consultative mechanisms, bodies) the representatives 
of civil organisations (may) appear directly in several ways. For example – to continue with 
the abovementioned example – according to the Government decree establishing the Roma 
Coordinative Council ‘[The] Government calls upon the leaders of central state administra-
tive bodies to ensure, in case of laws related to the social development of Roma people de-
fined in the legislative programme of the Government, the possibility to provide opinion for 
the [civilian and non-civilian] members of the Council within the public administrative ne-
45 ibid. 
46 Within the scope of the examined field the inter-ministerial Committee for Social development and Roma is-
sues supports those written in section a) herein. The Government established the inter-ministerial Committee 
for Social development and Roma issues for improving the standard of living and social status of Roma peo-
ple and those living in poverty and for the harmonisation of governmental activities aiming at facilitating their 
social integration. The primary task of the inter-ministerial Committee for Social development and Roma is-
sues – based on Government decision 1199/2010. (ix. 29.) on the establishment of the inter-ministerial Com-
mittee for Social development and Roma issues – is to harmonise activities related to social development, to 
make recommendations for the Government for the harmonised planning of the resource needs of tasks relat-
ed to the social development and for the supervision of finances, as well as to coordinate and evaluate the exe-
cution of governmental tasks aimed at improving the standard of living and social status of Roma people and 
those living in poverty and at facilitating their social integration.
47 An institutional realisation of those written in section b) herein (in the examined field) is the Roma Coordina-
tive Council established by Government decision 1102/2011. (iV. 15.) on the establishment of the Roma Coor-
dinative Council, which was established by the Government based on social partnership for the establishment 
and execution of measures facilitating the effective development of the Roma population, as well as for render-
ing an opinion about the results. The Roma Coordinative Council is an advisory, consultative body supporting 
social development, and in line with the aims of the Government it is a specific forum for transmitting infor-
mation related to the interests of the concerned social groups into governmental work.
gotiation’. Furthermore, Section 49 of Government decree 1144/2010. (Vii. 7.) on the rules 
of procedures of the Government must be mentioned, according to which the undersecre-
tary for administration of the ministry of Public Administration and Justice may invite ex-
ternal persons – for example representatives of civil organisations – to the meeting of the 
undersecretary of administration; and its section 59, based on which persons – for example 
representatives of civil organisations – invited personally by the Prime minister may partic-
ipate at the meeting of the Government. 
Ad b) Basic types of governmental (central state administrative) consultative bodies – from the 
aspect of civil cooperation:
1. bodies ensuring membership-like civil participation48 (mixed system);
2. bodies composed of the delegates of only (central) state administrative bodies (e.g. Sulinet 
expressz Programme [internet at Schools express Programme] Project Council49) – with-
out civil organisational rights;
3. bodies composed of the delegates of only (central) state administrative bodies – with the 
possibility of direct channelling of civil interests;50
4. bodies composed exclusively of experts – without direct and expressed civil par ti ci pa-
tion;51
5. no civil member, but civil organisations may make suggestions for the appointment of mem-
bers (their opinion is requested in a formal procedure, e.g. Hungarian design Council52).
Ad c) Main forms of establishing membership:
1. ministerial request and appointment – without civilian cooperation (e.g. recommenda-
tion) before the appointment;
2. ministerial request and appointment – with the possibility (right) for civilian recommen-
dation;
48 The expression ‘civil participation’ primarily means those cases when the natural person participating in a con-
sultative body is representative of a civil organisation, not in his own name, directly due to his professional ex-
pertise gained at the given field.
49 Government decree 283/2003. (xii. 29.) on the tasks and operational rules of the Sulinet expressz Programme 
Project Council.
50 The president of the inter-ministerial Committee for Social development and Roma issues may invite other 
people – typically representatives of Roma civil organisations – based on the founding legal document.
51 See for example the composition of the Scientific Committee set forth in Article 6 paragraph (1) of Govern-
ment decree 112/2011 (Vii. 4.) on the (…) scientific committee supporting the work of the National Atomic 
energy Office. 
52 For the appointment of the members of the National design Council (mFT) the president of the National Of-
fice of intellectual Property makes a recommendation, for the creation of which he requests the opinion of re-
lated professional and interest representation organisations [Article 2 paragraph (2) of Government decree 
266/2001 (xii. 21.) on the Hungarian design Council].
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3. submission of a declaration of unilateral accession,53 and declaration of will54;
4. nominating a specific civil organisation in a normative source of law (e.g. HUNGARNeT 
Association55, or earlier the National Association of Hungarian Artists);
5. with election based on the candidacy system. 
it is important that the abovementioned types do not cover all types operating in practice, 
with special regard to the fact that the mechanisms of selecting (civilian) members and of 
the establishment of membership are not fixed in each case. A practical difficulty which has 
been mentioned in the literature for a long time is that in institutions (bodies) where there 
are provisions about the selection of civilian members, we usually only find the description 
of activities the performance of which allows organisations to participate, ‘but it is [often] 
left in the shadow what the exact mechanism is for their selection’ and what methods may 
be used for ensuring the democracy of the procedure.56 This deficient legal regulation allows 
the government (any government, not just the current one) to arbitrarily select from among 
organisations formally complying with all conditions, not necessarily paying attention to 
their real social significance and professional preparedness. 
Ad d) Legal regulation of consultative bodies – from the civil point of view:
Open legislation may become counterproductive if ‘the processing of opinions and the feed-
back procedure are not regulated and managed properly’ – says Vadál.57 mentioning these 
elements is especially important regarding the domestic – external – consultative bodies, be-
cause these communication aspects provide the basis of most practical difficulties.
Ad e) Rights and tools available for the civilian member or for the body with civilian member:
1. review;
2. recommendations;
3. negotiation of interests;
4. preparation of decisions;
53 According to Article 1 of ministry of Human Resources decree 50/2012. (xii. 19.) on the National Patient Fo-
rum any civil organisation may join the section of the National Patient Forum (herein after referred to as: NbF) 
in line with its activities with a declaration of accession sent to the board of the NbF if the civil organisation 
operates in compliance with act on civil organisations and performs its activities in the field of health care. 
54 According to Article 2 paragraphs (1) and (2) of Government decree 65/2000. (V. 9.) on the establishment and 
detailed rules of the operation of the Charitable Council, the public benefit organisations performing charitable 
tasks which want to become members of the Council may submit a related declaration of intent to the minister – 
and the minister shall automatically provide credentials for the representatives of those organisations which com-
ply with conditions set forth in Article 1 paragraph (2) and have submitted their declaration of intent. 
55 Section 1 of Government decision 1129/2013. (iii. 14.) on the establishment of the National information in-
frastructure development Programme Council and the definition of its rules of procedure the Government es-
tablished, as proposer, review and advisory body the National information infrastructure development Prog-
ramme Council, and its section 6 requests – among others – the president of the HUNGARNeT Association 
to participate in the work of the Programme council as a permanent member.
56 Héthy, Lajos. 2010. Civil beszéd vagy “párt-beszéd”? [Civil speech or “party-speech”?] budapest: Napvilág. 
57 Vadál (n 9) 162.
5. decision making;
6. coordination;
7. analysis and evaluation of execution;
8. lawsuit.58
Among – public power-like – rights which go beyond traditional consultative rights (the 
right to information, the right to negotiate, the right to make recommendations, the right 
to give an opinion) those shall be mentioned through which decision making power is di-
vided between the public administrative body (typically the Government) and the consulta-
tive body.59 in such cases the original possessor of the decision making right, who is respon-
sible for decision making, cannot deliver the decision on its own, because the concerting 
right (co-decision making right) of the mentioned body limits this. Naturally, in such cas-
es the original possessor of the decision-making right cannot fully delegate the right to de-
cision making or its responsibility for the decision (and the liability for its possible conse-
quences), but with the self-regulating ‘delegation’ of certain elements of decision making it 
may ensure substantial participation and unavoidable control-possibility to the representa-
tives of the targeted groups. A good – though as yet theoretical – example is the Framework 
Agreement established between the Government of Hungary and the National Roma Self-
Government [NRSG], based on which ‘Within their cooperation the Government and the 
NRSG establish a draft government decree, in which they define the certain fields of inter-
vention and the participants of the co-decision agreement and together with the bodies ap-
pointed for co-decision-making define the co-decision-making mechanism relevant for the 
given field, by taking into consideration, and keeping in line with, the valid eU and nation-
al procedural regulations’. in an exemplificative manner, the Framework Agreement defines 
those fields in which it wants to give to the NRSG effective and substantial rights for the en-
forcement of interests: ‘The Government establishes the co-decision system primarily in the 
fields of programs aiming at the expansion of employment, increasing standards of educa-
tion and improving standards of living, as well as of scholarship programs, investment and 
employment supports.’ it is clear, therefore, that the decision-making and co-decision-mak-
ing rights may primarily contain partial rights related to tenders, funds, or personal issues, 
sometimes not in a substantial manner, but ‘only’ in form of veto60 or ‘quasi veto’, these lat-
ter ones covering the elements which, for example, allow for the postponement of decision-
making or the suspension of the execution of the delivered decisions.61 
58 The rule defined in Article 25 paragraph (7) of Act xxVi of 1998 on the rights and equal opportunities of dis-
abled persons, according to which against those violating the rights of disabled persons defined in law the Na-
tional Council for disabled and the national interest representative organisations of disabled persons may ini-
tiate a lawsuit. 
59 Vadál (n 9)  61. and 86. 
60 The exclusive recommendation right and the right to initiative, as well as the right to consent and the decision 
bound to a certain voting rate may be considered as such.
61 For details see: Rixer, Ádám. 2013. A roma érdekek megjelenítése a jogalkotásban. [emergence of Roma inter-
ests in legislation] budapest: Patrocinium. 158-160.
24 25
stu
die
s •
ÁdÁm RixeR •  CiViL ORGANiSATiONS'  PARTiCiPATiON iN LeGiSL ATiVe PRO CeSSeS iN HUNGARY
Ad g) Types of consultative bodies related to certain governmental levels:
We may distinguish between bodies established beside non-local-governments based on 
whether they were created by the Government or independently from it. The best exam-
ple for the latter is the National economic and Social Committee established by Act Cxiii 
of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Committee, which was created with the aim of 
discussing comprehensive ideas related to economic and societal development and nation-
al strategies existing through governmental cycles, and facilitating the elaboration and re-
alisation of harmonised and balanced economic growth and the related social models. The 
Committee was established as a consultative, proposer and advisory body independent from 
the Parliament and the Government, and as the complex and most diverse consultative fo-
rum of social dialogue between organisations representing employers’ and employees’ inter-
ests, economic chambers, civil organisations operating in the field of national policy, nation-
al and foreign representatives of science, and churches defined in a separate act.62 it is worth 
noting that the solution is not unique in Hungarian legal development.63 it is important that 
independence from the government does not mean that during the activities of the forums, 
opinions of the Government and civil organisations cannot be directly in conflict or that the 
government cannot be substantially ‘influenced’ in some ways.64
in addition to the most comprehensive consultative mechanism(s), consultative bodies 
operating beside the Government and certain central state administrative bodies form a sep-
arate category; these partly appear in classic, sectoral fields (health care, education, social is-
sues, economic issues65, etc.), and partly may be identified as intersectoral fields (e.g. see the 
before mentioned Roma issue). 
in addition to consultative bodies operating beside or ‘between’ central state administra-
tive bodies the territorial consultative bodies, or bodies with a consultative type of tasks shall 
be mentioned, the majority of which may be characterised as so-called quasi state admin-
istrative bodies. These may also be called atypical mixed bodies, insofar as they appear nei-
62 Article 2 paragraph (1) of Act xCiii of 2011 on the National economic and Social Council.
63 The economic and Social Council – which has always operated in an unstructured way and without substan-
tial rights – was established in the building of the Parliament on 24 August 2004, and wished to remain a pro-
fessional forum independent from the government and party politics ‘by discussing long-term national, stra-
tegic issues’. in the Council, national trade unions and employers’ interest representatives, and representatives 
of chambers, investors, civil organisations and science were present as members. The GSZT expressly aimed at 
being the forum of national consensus seeking to rise above everyday political fights. in this institution the dif-
ferent sectors were allowed to present their opinions about issues the nation was facing that would determine 
long-term development.
64 For example, based on Article 153 paragraph (1) of Act i of 2012 on the Labour Code, the Government shall 
receive authorisation to define in decree – after consultation in the National economic and Social Council – 
about a) the lowest obligatory wage and b) the amount and validity of the guaranteed wage minimum.
65 See for example Government decision 1166/2012. (V. 22.) on the reorganisation of the budget estimate from 
reserves available for extraordinary governmental measures in order to ensure the resources necessary for the 
performance of the tasks of the Corporate sector and the Government’s Permanent Consultative Forum.
ther as fully state administrative, nor fully local-governmental, syndicate types of bodies.66 
it is true in general that the main reason for their existence is that the presentation of gen-
eral and local interests, abilities and expectations could not be possible or reasonable at the 
same time at other forums or scenes. These creatures may be described as territorial coop-
erative mechanisms – typically aiming at programme making – insofar as they primarily try 
to act as forums for the exchange of opinions and for dialogue between civilians and local-
governmental and state administrative (types of) bodies. They are usually without organisa-
tional independence, but they are usually independent in executing their tasks and compe-
tences. examples of such mechanisms are the Regional Social Policy Committees or the Re-
gional Tourism Boards. 
Summary statements and general conclusions in relation to consultation
it is an assumption in legal literature – which goes beyond our specific subject – that the rela-
tionship of the established forums for the preparation of decisions and for negotiation, their 
specific role and significance should be clarified in law.67 For a long time the main question 
has been whether in the case of decision-making mechanisms supplemented with mainly 
informal, ‘customised’ elements, the strictness of the legal regulations (deeper and more ac-
countable than today) – and of the transparency and higher level of legal security theoreti-
cally achievable by this – would impose great difficulties in reaching substantial compromis-
es and using practical ‘quickly reacting’ methods. it may be stated that the difference mech-
anisms aiming at the preparation of decisions should be formalised through more detailed 
legal provisions than today.68
Among further difficulties, on the one hand, the low level of professional preparedness 
and material resources of social players (the latter may appear, for example, in relation to the 
costs of preparing an expert opinion), and, on the other hand, as the capacity deficiency of 
the governmental side, the lack of such civil servant staff – specialised in negotiating activi-
ties – in central public administration may be mentioned.
4.3. Tools Influencing the Legislator Indirectly, Through Other Bodies
Here those possibilities will be presented through which the citizen or the civil organisation 
influences the contents of laws enacted by competent public administrative bodies by ap-
proaching not the legislator but another state organisation. in some cases, these mechanisms 
may make the chances of influencing the legislator rather indirect, and sometimes – as will 
66 Patyi, András and Varga, Zs. András. 2012. Általános közigazgatási jog (az Alaptörvény rendszerében). [Gener-
al administrative law (Within the system of the Fundamental Law)] budapest: dialóg Campus. 329.
67 See for example Trócsányi, László. 1993. Közjogi változások és a rendszerváltás. [Public law changes and the 
transition] magyar Közigazgatás (1993) 7: 5. 
68 Kéri, László. 2001. A kormányzati döntéshozatal szervezetszociológiai nézőpontból. [Governmental decision-
making from organisational sociology point of view] in Közpolitika. Szöveggyűjtemény. [Public Policy Reader] 
edited by Pesti, Sándor. budapest: Rejtjel. 218.
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be shown – quite distant (through the initiation of the review of the content of the given law, 
which may lead to the annulment of the law or legal regulation by the Constitutional Court). 
Such tools may be, among others,
1. Constitutional complaint. According to article 24 paragraph (2) section c) of the Funda-
mental Law, based on the constitutional complaint the Constitutional Court – which may 
be approached also by the civil organisation concerned about the given issue – reviews the 
harmony of the law used in the individual case with the Fundamental Law;
2. Initiating the procedure of the parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights. Accord-
ing to article 24 paragraph (2) section e) of the Fundamental Law, upon the initiative of 
the Government, one-fourth of the members of Parliament, the president of the Curia, 
the Chief Prosecutor or the parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights, the Consti-
tutional Court reviews the harmony of laws with the Fundamental Law within the frame-
works of subsequent norm control. The related procedure of the parliamentary commis-
sioner of fundamental rights may be initiated by anyone, in line with article 30 paragraph 
(1) of the Fundamental Law.
5. CONCLUSiON
it can be stated that the Hungarian legal system makes it possible to channel the direct 
and institutionalised participation of civil entities within program- and law-making activi-
ties of organs belonging to public administration, expressing their interests. moreover, the 
Hungarian legal system has introduced developed and sophisticated mechanisms even com-
pared to the international legal practice. 
Real deficiencies can be rather detected concerning the material and legal consequences 
of different initiatives, the frequency of convening various corporate bodies, and mere for-
mal mode of operating the particular mechanisms.
Furthermore, the trouble is that the civil/non-profit sector is strongly „infected” by direct 
partican politics in Hungary: there’s a large number of pseudo-civil entities and initiatives 
within the scope of activities of proposal-making, advisory and coordinative bodies. 
A special appearance of the abovementioned difficulties is the lack of strong and effective 
state-civil society joint mechanisms which aggregate and uphold Roma (Gypsy) interests. 
in summary we can draw the conclusion that  the individual segments of civil society, the 
political culture and also the administrative bodies participating in legislation i. e. their rep-
resentatives must improve to comply with the already existing legal framework of statuto-
ry instruments. 
Ilona Bodonyi
PolIce In dIveRse socIety
in the past about 50 (in Eastern Europe 20-25) years society and police has been through two dra-
matic changes; political changes and turning into multicultural, diverse society. The responses of so-
ciety, of politics and the police to these circumstances were quite different, regardless, that the inter-
national and EU institutions facing the problems tried to formulate the adequate requirements (Par-
liamentary Assembly Assemblée parlementaire RESOLUTION 690 (1979) Declaration on the Po-
lice; COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS Recommendation Rec(2001)10 of 
the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Code of police Ethics). 
During the process of the political changes the role of police in society was reconsidered; it “was 
no longer viewed as dangerous, unsavory, diversionary, and politically retrograde, but as key com-
ponent of social stability and economic development” (Bayley, D.). And now, the most important 
question is: how is it possible to create an organization that strengthens democracy’s values and 
norms in its structure and function, and is able to answer the new challenges of the diversity? 
Diversity means differences in the backgrounds or lifestyles, it relates to gender, age, lan-
guage, ethnicity, cultural background (multiculturalism), disability, sexual orientation or reli-
gious belief. Diversity also means differences in other aspects; in educational level, job, socio-
economic background, personality profile, geographic location, differences in interest and dif-
ferences in political conviction. That is why every society has its special conditions, which affect 
the responsibility of the politics and the police. 
States have different styles and strategies when it comes to dealing with diverse groups with-
in their borders. Concerning these circumstances the presentation will analyse these strategies, 
their theoretical background (principle of multiculturalism, inclusion, integration), aims (first 
of all the sustainable development) bad and good practices, and the possible societal responses 
(acceptance; prejudice, societal conflicts; hate crime). In case of the analysis of a diverse socie-
ty  security aspects should also be taken into consideration. The police strategy and philosophy 
must be harmonised with the democratic responses of  politics on societal diversity; police need 
an adequate education in order to meet these requirements.
iNTROdUCTiON
The relationship between police and society is one of the most exciting questions in democ-
racy. in an autocratic political system the police is a simple device in the hands of a narrow 
